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INVITED REVIEW

Organ Procurement, Values and Public Policy
RONALD P. HAMEL*

ABSTRACT - Th_e success ~forgan transplants in recent years has created a shortage of transplantable cadaver
organs. Voluntansm, ~he pnmary mode of organ procurement currently in use nationwide, appears to be no
longer succes~ful. Pohcy_makers and others are examining alternatives to the current system, namely, presumed
conse_nt (routme salvagmg) and required request. In this process, there is a danger in considering only the
effectiveness of the means and neglecting the value and belief commitments that underlie them. These need to
b~ br?ught to t~e surface beca~se they ultimately contribute toward shaping the moral character of society. In
th1s hgh~, reqmred request m•ght be a preferable public policy option because it balances the values of
volunta~1sm (au~on?my, individual rights, and charity) with those of presumed consent (community, social
well-bemg, and JUStice). It also promises to be more effective than either of the other two alternatives.

Introduction
Organ transplantation is a phenomenon of just a little more
than a quarter century. In the 36 years since Dr. David Hume of
Boston performed the first modern kidney transplant using a
cadaver organ, transplantation has become a procedure more
frequently employed and increasingly successful. This has
been due to important advances in recent years, namely,
greater sophistication in surgical techniques, better methods
of tissue typing, and the discovery of new immunosuppressive
drugs such as cyclosporin. The latter has greatly increased the
survival rate of transplant recipients.
This success, however, is not without its problems. Chief
among them is the procurement oftransplantable organs. Not
only is there an existing gap between the need for organs and
the available supply, but this gap is rapidly widening. Recent
studies indicate that in 1982 there were only 2,500 organ
donors in this country out of 20,000 potential candidates
-young to middle-aged persons who have suffered brain
death as the result of accident, drowning, gunshots to the
head, and viral infection among other causes. Hence, only
about 15% of the possible pool of donors make provisions for
the use of their organs ( 1). Meanwhile, hundreds of people
die each year awaiting transplants, and thousands of others do
not receive the transplants that would greatly enhance their
quality of life.
The procurement of additional organs poses a serious and
urgent public policy issue. The current mechanism for obtaining transplantable organs, known as "voluntarism," was developed in the early days of transplantation and no longer
appears to be effective. A number of alternatives -presumed
consent and required request - have been and are continuing to be considered by policymakers, health care providers,
ethicists, and others. One of these, "required request," will
probably come up before the 1987 Minnesota legislature.
Several states - California, Oregon, and New York among
them - have already opted for this approach. If more and
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more states follow suit, a new public policy for the procurement of cadaver organs will have emerged.
In considering which procedure to pursue, lawmakers and
other participants in the debate need to realize that the issue
in question is not only one of efficiency and effectiveness. The
only concern is not and cannot be increasing the number of
organs for transplant, though this would certainly appear to be
the sole or, if not the sole, at least the dominant issue. In the
humanitarian concern to save and improve life and in the
fascination with and confidence in such technological developments, society could be swept away by a pragmatic concern
for what works. Policy shapers at all levels could neglect the
larger and more nebulous questions of meaning and how
choices about what to do shape the kinds of persons and the
kinds of communities that individuals and societies become.
Achievements in medicine challenge society not only technologically, but also humanly. The choices to be made are not
only about technological progress, but also about human
development.
This is so because underlying the procedural considerations in the retrieval of organs are considerations about basic
values such as autonomy, justice, and charity as well as some
basic beliefs about the relation of the individual to society, the
treatment of the newly dead, the importance of the human
body, the responsibilities of family members for a deceased
~ndividual, the obligation to save life and to pursue technologIcal progress. Implicitly or explicitly, these factors are an
intrinsic part of public policy choices in the matter of organ
procurement.
There are at least two levels, therefore, to decisions about
how to increase the supply of cadaver organs - the practical
level dealing with the most effective mechanism, and the
theoretical or meaning level dealing with the values and
beliefs that society commits itself to in opting for a particular
procedure. Both are the concern of this paper. I intend to
examine the three dominant policy options- voluntarism,
presumed consent, and required request - in terms of 1)
their workability and effectiveness, and 2) the underlying
assumptions of each, and attempt to argue for the preferability
of required request at both levels.
3

Social Policy Options for Organ Procurement
Voluntarism
As previously noted, the primary mode of organ retrieval
presently in use nationwide is "voluntarism." This procedure
consists in an individual's making provision while alive for the
donation of one or more organs if and when brain-death has
been determined, or a family's giving consent for donation in
the absence of such provision. In the first case, the prospective
donor's decision is communicated either through a donor
card, or by an appropriate indication on a driver's license, or
both. In the latter case, next of kin may either come forward to
donate organs or be approached by hospital personnel to do
so.
This mechanism emerged in the late 1960s, the early days of
organ transplantation. Once cornea transplants began to be
performed in the 1950s, states found it necessary to enact
legislation providing for the possibility of individuals donating all or part of their bodies to medicine. By 1965, most states
had some legal provision in place, but these differed from
state to state. Some had no mechanism whatsoever. In the
interests of uniformity, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act (UAGA) in 1968. It was adopted by all states and the
District of Columbia by 1971.
The Act, based on individual freedom and autonomous
choice, contained several provisions (2). The two major ones
-personal voluntary donation and next-of-kin donationwere noted above. In addition, the Act recognized a donor
card as a valid legal document when witnessed by two people.
This, in effect, means that the wishes of the decedent take
precedence over those of the family, and that health care
personnel who comply with it are not subject to litigation. In
those cases where the decedent has expressed no intentions,
the Act established a clear order of priority for next-of-kin
consent as well as a mechanism for obtaining that consent (a
written message, telegram, or recorded telephone message).
This method of organ procurement seems not to be working. Critics offer several explanations ( 1, 3 ). First, the majority
of Americans have not indicated their wishes regarding organ
donation. This does not seem to indicate a reluctance to
donate (a 1983 Gallup poll found that 70% of Americans are
willing) as much as it does a lack of initiative in taking the
appropriate steps, or a lack of awareness about how to do so.
The majority of the population never comes into contact with
the donor card. It is estimated that only 20% of the population
have signed cards and only 3% are carrying them at the time
they are pronounced brain dead. States differ in how they use
the driver's license for organ donation. Some provide a checkoff box, others stamp "organ donor" on the license, and yet
others attach donor cards to the licenses. In any case, no state
has more than a 20% positive indication.
Second, even though an individual may have signed a
donor card or have made the appropriate indication on a
driver's license, the donor card and/or license might not be
sought or found by medical personnel. Medical personnel, in
turn, might or might not inquire of next of kin whether this
particular individual is known to be an organ donor. Here the
fault lies with health care providers. Some may simply lack
initiative, or interest in organ transplantation, while others
may be inadvertent to the opportunity for retrieving organs or
the mechanisms for doing so, while yet others may recoil from
the situation for psychological reasons ( 4) or because of
discomfort in approaching family at a time of extreme crisis.
Third, even though it may be clear that an individual is an
organ donor, hospital personnel will almost always request
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permission from the next of kin, even though this is unnecessary according to the UAGA. Physicians and nurses do this to
respect the family's quasi-property rights over the body and
their wishes regarding donation, as well as to avoid bad
publicity and the possibility of future litigation. Rarely if ever
are family wishes overturned even though they might contradict the previously expressed desires of the decedent. Hence,
in effect, donor cards serve only to sensitize people to the
possibility of organ donation and to convey to families the
wishes of a now deceased member.
These are the pragmatic procedural considerations. They
deal with what does or does not work. But what are the value
questions associated with voluntarism? What are the assumptions and convictions underlying this particular public policy
option?
Blair and Alfred Sadler,Jr., very strong proponents of voluntarism, argue that the current system strikes a balance between
individual values and rights, and the possibility of donating
and obtaining organs (5, 6). That is to say, it provides a mode
of organ procurement while at the same time respects individual freedom of choice, freedom of religion, and the right to
privacy, as well as the personal and aesthetic interests of the
family, and encourages public support for and involvement in
transplantation efforts. Voluntarism allows the individual to
decide about the disposition of his or her body after death and
protects the family's quasi-property rights over the body.
Equally, if not more important, it maintains the "gift" character
of organ donation.
Another advocate of voluntarism, Paul Ramsey, proposed
two reasons for what he called "organized giving" in his 1970
book, The Patient As Person (7). The first centers on people's
religious or nonreligious convictions about the body that
might incline them to not want to donate. These individuals
should not have to fight a system that might infringe on these
beliefs and choices in a time of crisis. The second and perhaps
more important reason is the impact of "giving" rather than
"taking" upon the human community. A routine taking of
organs not only would deprive individuals of an opportunity
to exercise the virtue of generosity, it would also not contribute to the fostering and strengthening of "consensual community." According to Ramsey, responding to the need for
gifts by giving has a civilizing effect and "meets the measure of
authentic community." In effect, he cautions against a utilitarian mentality in the service of medical progress and even
saving lives that fails to recognize other crucial and even more
basic considerations.
William E. May, a Protestant ethicist, in many respects
echoes Ramsey's views ( 8 ). He too believes that voluntarism
is an expression of"self-donative love," a form of"assistance
that one mortal renders another," and that such giving will
have a positive influence on the quality of the community. He
is also concerned about the body. For May, the corpse should
enjoy a kind of "extra-territoriality," that is to say, it does not
belong without limit to society. The state does not have an
unlimited claim upon the person whether living or dead. In
fact, traditionally, society has recognized "quasi-property
rights" to the corpse in the next of kin. While these property
rights do not extend to a commercial use of the corpse, they
do allow the family to possess the body and to carry out its
right and obligation to attend to the corpse's disposition.
Normally, no other entity can put claims upon the body that
would interfere with this right. And, certainly, the family
should not have to claim the body as its possession. Such
would seem to be the case with a policy of rountine salvaging
of organs.
Advocates of voluntarism, therefore, in addition to their
journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science

belief that it is an adequate mechanism, also see it as upholding the "gift" character of organ donation, as a schooling in the
virtue of generosity, as an affirmation of individual free choice
and particular rights, and as a protection against an excessive
claim of the state upon the individual. They tend to come
down on the side of individualism.
Presumed Consent
A second public policy alternative for the retrieval of transplantable organs is what is known as "presumed consent" or
"routine salvaging." It has been proposed by a number of
individuals for adoption in the United States in place of the
current system. Presumed consent is now employed in a
number of European nations including Austria, Denmark,
France, Italy, Israel, Poland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland.
Under presumed consent, it is assumed that individuals are
in fact willing to donate their organs when death has been
determined. Given appropriate circumstances (brain death,
proper age, healthy organs, etc.), organs and tissues will routinely be harvested unless there has been a prior objection
registered either by the individual or by next of kin. Hence,
the burden here is shifted from the medical personnel to
obtain consent to the individual or family to refuse it. In the
absence of objections, the individual is considered a potential
donor (9).
Indications are that presumed consent has not been particularly effective in resolving the shortage of transplantable
organs in those countries in which it is being employed. In
part, this seems to be due to the fact that physicians in these
countries do not remove organs without the prior consent of
next of kin even though this is not legally required. Some
families refuse, while in other cases physicians are reluctant to
aproach family members at all with the request. Supporters of
this alternative argue that were it to be employed as it should
be, it would be effective.
Why a policy of presumed consent, beyond the practical
hope that it will ameliorate the shortage of organs for
transplant?
In a recent article, Kevin O'Rourke and Philip Boyle argue
for presumed consent on the basis of justice, more specifically, legal or general justice ( 10, 11 ). As members of a community, citizens have an obligation in justice to contribute to
the good of the community. Because the life and health of
individuals contribute to the overall well-being ofthe society,
O'Rourke and Boyle argue that there is some obligation in
justice to be willing to give one's organs after death. Community interests in this proposal would seem to take some priority
over individual and familial interests and rights.
Arthur Caplan, recently appointed Director of the Center for
Bioethics at the University of Minnesota, though he himself
does not espouse presumed consent, does suggest a possible
further justification in the principle of beneficence (3). In
contrast to the principle of nonmaleficence which requires
that harm not be done to others, beneficence means that we
ought to do good to others. The question arises in the application of this principle: How much good does one have a duty to
perform? Are there limits to what one must do for another?
These types of questions have normally been answered in this
way. People have a duty to benefit others when the expected
benefit is significant, when it is likely to occur, and when it is
of little or no risk or harm to the individual. In the case of
organ donation, there is no suffering, pain, or harm for the
deceased. Significant benefit will come to the recipient, and
there is a high likelihood of its coming about. Therefore, some
would suggest that there is even a moral duty to donate one's
Volume 53, Number 3, 1986/87

organs. Routine harvesting simply assumes that one would
want to fulfill one's duty to others who are in need, who can
benefit. A life can be saved or the living of a life can be
improved at no cost to the donor.
Why do the critics of presumed consent oppose it? We
return here to Ramsey and May. Neither sees this particular
option to be ethically unacceptable. Rather they view it as
undesirable at the level of underlying meanings.
Ramsey laments the shift from "giving" to "taking." One can
no longer speak of organ "donation" because the "giving" of
organs would really result from a failure to positively refuse
the gift. Furthermore, presumed consent violates the "sacred
trust" of the family for the body of the deceased expressed in
the quasi-property rights discussed above. What social interests override this sacred trust? Is the need for organs to be
included with other exceptions such as autopsies in criminal
investigations or in cases of communicable disease? These
quasi-property rights, according to Ramsey, are based not only
on positive law, but on a deeper sense of "familial duties and
sacred trusts arising out of our common humanity."
May is likeminded in this critique of routine salvaging. He
raises two objections. First, he notes that many people have an
aversion to the notion of routine salvaging, an aversion that
should not be ignored even for laudable goals. He does not
believe that perceptions of social need should override all
other considerations or that the means for obtaining organs
should become "everyday, routine, and casual." Second, May
is concerned about the possible impact of this mechanism
upon society's image of the hospital. What has traditionally
been perceived as a place of healing and recuperation could,
with routine harvesting, be seen as a "devourer." In the hospital, one's very vitals are devoured by the state on behalf of the
social order. The consumption that dominates society is now
consummated in the health care institution. All of this could
weaken the trust that is the basis of the healing art.
Two other objections have been raised to presumed consent, but in its more extreme form, sometimes called "strong
presumed consent." Here, organs are routinely retrieved
regardless of objections to the contrary. Such a policy according to Blair and Alfred Sadler, raises constitutional issues. It
would seem, in the first place, to violate the First Amendment
to the Constitution if it prevented a person who believed that
his faith required him to be buried intact from freely exercising this religious belief. Those justifying this approach would
need to show that there was both an overriding public need
for organs and no other way to obtain an adequate supply. In
the second place, there might also be possibility of a violation
of the 14th Amendment in depriving an individual or next of
kin control over disposition ofthe corpse after death, a possible violation of due process. Again, overriding this right would
depend on there being a lifesaving need and no other
alternatives.
Required Request
There is yet a third possible policy option for the procurement of organs. it has been termed "required request" by
Arthur Caplan, who is one of its major proponents (3).
Under required request, a properly trained hospital representative would be obliged to approach the family of all
potential donors at the time of death. In those cases where an
individual has signed a donor card or has some other written
designation of intent, this system would ensure that medical
personnel or next of kin attempt to locate it. If there is no such
indication, and for the majority of Americans there probably
would not be, then family would have to be asked for permission to retrieve organs.
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Clearly, responsibility for obtaining organs is placed upon
hospital personnel. In order to ensure compliance with a
required request statute, a form would need to be completed
in each case ascertaining that the request had been made, and
this form would later be attached to the death certificate. A
required request statute, which ideally would be enacted in
every state, would allow for exceptions if it were believed that
approaching a particular family would be harmful to them.
This, too, would have to be put in writing.
Why this approach? In the first place, it respects the autonomy of the individual and of the family, as well as the
quasi-property rights of the latter. Furthermore, since it is the
next of kin who have responsibility for the disposition of the
body, it would not seem to be an undue burden to inquire of
them about a use of the body prior to disposition. Secondly, it
involves next of kin in the process of organ procurement.
Although the circumstances in which the request is made are
stressful, most families will consent when asked and most will
find it therapeutic. Thirdly, this mechanism maintains the
"gift" character of donation and, by not making procurement
routine, it protects somewhat against developing a "spare·
parts" mentality. Fourthly, it seems to recognize a mild duty in
justice to make the gift of one's organs. While it does not
require this exercise of justice, it does seem to imply that
donating one's organs for the good of society is perhaps
something that one should do, and so next of kin will be asked
to do so. Fifthly, it places the burden of organ procurement on
the medical profession where it in fact belongs. If transplan·
tors and transplant programs wish more cadaver organs, it is
they who should take the initiative to obtain them.
If it is the case that the majority of people in this country are
willing to be donors but no one bothers to ask them to donate,
then required request seems to make some sense. The drawback, of course, is in approaching family members in a time of
extreme crisis. However, a policy of required request, if sufficiently publicized and accompanied by educational strate·
gies, could generate discussion of organ donation among
family members, allowing for personal wishes to be known,
and create the expectation that requests will be made in cases
of brain death. To some degree this might reduce the element
of surprise, awkwardness, and stress. Required request has
been successful where it has been employed.

Conclusion
Three public policy options for the procurement of transplantable organs and tissues have been considered as a possible means for resolving or at least alleviating the current
shortage. Each has much to be said for and against it. If one
were to consider only the end result - an increase in the
number of available organs - one might be inclined to opt
for a form of compulsory retrieval. However, if one takes
account of the value dimensions of that alternative, it would
become relatively clear that it tends toward a communitarian,
even a utilitarian, emphasis. Such a direction is not without its
problems, particularly when the major issues in medical
ethics are becoming less individually focused and more societally focused. In pursuing the good of society as a whole or the
good of the greatest number, there is danger of riding rough·
shod over the individual. In the extreme, this approach will
sacrifice the one for the good of the whole or the many.
Opting for presumed consent nationwide may appear to be of
minor significance in the much broader picture ofbioethical
choices and policies, and of even less significance in the
whole range of societal decisions. But society's commitment
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to this mechanism would also be a commitment to certain
values and beliefs. It would be part of a pattern that shapes the
kind of people we are and become.
On the other hand, voluntarism tends perhaps too much to
the side of individualism. Ours is an age of individualism, an
individualism that frequently takes the form of an assertion of
personal rights that actually translates into the pursuit of one's
interests and desires unhindered. One of the dangers here, as
Robert Bellah points out in Habits of the Heart (12), is a
forgetfulness of community, a loss of the sense of the common good and of our responsibilities as members of society to
contribute to the well-being of the whole. The emphasis on
freedom, autonomy, self-determination, and individual rights,
taken to excess, can undermine social life.
Both presumed consent and voluntarism reflect and promote crucial, though different, values and beliefs. It may be
that required request, at least to some degree, blends and
balances the commitments inherent in the other two alternatives. It respects individual autonomy and rights while working toward the good of society. It promotes free giving, while
perhaps suggesting a mild duty in justice to meet the need of
others by giving one's organs. For this reason, it may be a
preferable public policy option.
There is undoubtedly good reason to be concerned about
the need for transplantable organs, but there is also good
reason to be at least as concerned about the means employed
in obtaining them. As Willard Gay lin, president ofthe Hastings
Center, has said so well: "Sustaining life is an urgent argument
for any measure, but not if that measure destroys those very
qualities that make life worth sustaining." ( 13).
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